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Introduction
The end of the Cold War gave the (Western) world an ap-
parent reprieve from weapons of mass destruction. Then 
came HIV and AIDS. Since then, a host of human inse-
curities and pandemic threats have converged to upend 
that semblance of order. 
The ‘grand decade of global health’ (2000-2010) posited 
a litany of responses. These were meant to (re)establish 
order. They were overwhelmingly characterized by verti-
cal (top-down) solutions to individual health threats: HIV, 
tuberculosis, and malaria being the three diseases which 
received the most attention. Being infectious diseases, 
this focus left non-communicable diseases (NCDs), ma-
ternal health, mental health, and even (re)emerging (in-
fectious) diseases largely in the lurch. It also neglected 
horizontal responses based on local networks and knowl-
edge: the successful response of some communities to 
the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa showcases 
alternative solutions.1  Yet with the grand decade over, 
the a priori importance once attached to health has dis-
appeared from the international agenda. 
Indeed, health has only regained a fraction of its policy 
prioritization through the ascendance onto the interna-
tional agenda of potential epidemic/pandemic threats 
such as Ebola and Zika. Here, however, the risk of non-
intervention almost pales in comparison with the risk 
of intervention: “Epidemics appear not only as a threat, 
but as a challenge, a chance for the interventionist state 
that wants to prove its ability to act against infectious 
disease.”2 Compounding the direct challenges posed by 
epidemics and pandemics themselves are the indirect 
complications such as “panic, social unrest and econom-
ic consequences”3  which up the ante for response – with 
unknown consequences:4  A number of regions of Bra-
zil “proactively declared a public health emergency with 
regard to Zika in November 2015.”5  If and when the ex-
panded political, and military, powers granted under the 
emergency are not revoked, these could lead to serious 
infringement of biological and civil liberties.
The current context is one defined by varying degrees of 
disorder. This is the state of affairs in the realms of geo-
politics to market (dis)regulation, of climate (dis)agree-
ment to (il)legal migration status. Each of these has a 
bearing on global as well as local health. In fact, health is 
of particular importance as its causes and consequenc-
es, alongside its associated vulnerabilities and threats, 
crosses borders. 
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As such, mounting a coordinated effort to respond to 
global health issues is an imperative. The question is, 
how to do it?
Evidence and Analysis
The most critical challenge to coordinating global health 
responses is that there is no global health coordination.6 
At the global level the World Health Organization (WHO) 
serves as an institutional figurehead. It collects and col-
lates information on health risks and vulnerabilities. It 
also issues guidelines towards which states can orient 
their health policies. The WHO does not, nor does any 
other organizational body, issue, direct, and enforce glob-
al health policy. 
There are two glaring problems with this arrangement: 
1.  The WHO has no authority with which to implement 
or intervene7  to enable or enforce its guidelines. 
2.  WHO-directed global health coordination is a verti-
cal construct which assumes global guidelines can 
or should be suitable for state-level or local political, 
economic, and social conditions. Any strength of 
the WHO’s recommendations rests on the accept-
ance and integration of a norm – for example the 
norm of reporting an infectious disease outbreak 
within a prescribed period of time: 24 hours. If the 
norm is not accepted and integrated, it does not be-
come a norm. While various mechanisms have been 
employed to attempt to bridge the gap between 
local and global health perceptions and policies, 
none has proven to have sustainable traction. An 
additional third problem is with the norm propaga-
tion itself: 73 new ‘harmonization initiatives’8  have 
been initiative in an attempt to secure agreement 
on global health coordination: an oxymoron. 
This is the case with regard to the WHO’s curtailed pow-
ers, and pertains to health coordination at the regional 
level, e.g. within the European Union (EU) as well. On 
the global level, the EU participates in the Global Health 
Security Agenda, which while raising relevant concerns 
has no action mechanism. On the regional level, the EU 
Commission articulates ‘principles’ and offers guidance 
to Member States on health policies, but it does not and 
cannot issue – and thus coordinate – binding legal poli-
cies. The emergent gaps of this approach include, in the 
post-2007 financial crisis era, Spain’s revoking much 
health care access for new migrants, and the systemic 
discrepancy between commitments to health and health 
spending and actual disbursements.9 Fundamentally, 
global health coordination is State health coordination.
Acknowledging that States are the entities which retain 
the right and responsibility for implementation of health 
policies, the challenge is to formulate and coordinate 
health responses in support. 
In order to do this, five critical policy issues must be tak-
en into account:  
First, local outbreaks can and do rapidly spread to 
become epidemics and even pandemics. Given increas-
ingly mobile populations, this trend is set to increase. 
Knowledge and information collected at the global level 
has the potential to both inform local preparedness and 
to mobilize in turn global and local resources in a joint 
response. The response itself has the highest chance of 
proving successful when it includes local, national, inter-
national and global entry – and exit – points.  
Second, responding to a health risk or threat is a fun-
damentally political act. “The fundamental lesson, unsur-
prising to anyone familiar with the history of social engi-
neering and foreign aid in Africa, is that AIDS effects are 
driven ultimately by institutional and political interests.”10 
National as well as international political leaders must 
be on board.11   
Third, responses to health crises – risks or threats – 
exhibit a disconnect between State, non-state and global 
institutional responsibilities. The result is a diffusion of 
definitional, prioritization, decision-making and imple-
mentation powers. The result is more confusion than 
coordination. 
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Fourth, each disease outbreak is different, and its re-
quired response is as well.  
Each disease outbreak is potentially different, with 
varied epidemiology, infection, morbidity, and mortality 
rates and requiring diverse control measures, means that 
each outbreak obliges governments to be flexible in how 
they respond.12  
The fifth and final critical insight is that disease out-
break, including epidemic and pandemic anticipation and 
response, depends on and in turn creates health security. 
Health security is a local, national, regional, international, 
and global challenge.   
Global health security depends on many factors—
robust disease surveillance systems, reliable health 
information, prevention, diagnostic, and treatment 
services, financing, and strong political commitment. 
But without skilled health professionals, who should 
be valued and protected everywhere, to act as the first 
line of defence of individual health security, other ef-
forts will be in vain.13 
It means that at every level individual health is a consti-
tutive part of global health security. On all levels, such 
health security is not merely a ‘nice to have’, but a ‘must 
have’, in an increasingly interconnected world.14 Con-
necting these levels is diplomacy; notably a diplomacy 
that takes into account local conditions and culture and 
renders these relevant globally. The EL-CSID project ex-
plores the role in particular of cultural, science and in-
novation diplomacy – also to innovate in heath security. 
Policy Implications and Recommendations
Successful policy depends upon its resonance, applica-
bility and implementation at the individual, local, State, 
international and global levels. 
1.  At the global level, the current restrictions of State 
authority demand a policy response which focuses 
on defining and defending global health. The Frame-
work Convention on Global Health (FCGH) is a step 
in this direction.15, 16  If adopted, the FCGH’s status 
as a treaty would enhance – but not guarantee – its 
enforcement.  
2.  Critically, the enforcement guarantee, or the ultimate 
global health coordination, remains with States. 
Here three new policy ideas are proposed to facili-
tate such coordination: 
First, that States be recognized as bearing the onus 
of identifying and prioritizing necessary health interven-
tions. This has three components. 
1. The establishment of the University of Pretoria, 
South Africa’s Zoonoses Research Unit (2016), for 
example, anticipates the further (re)emergence of 
this class of diseases, to which HIV, Ebola and Zika 
all belong. The research resulting from this should 
be shared (inter)nationally for the benefit of global 
preparations for    (r)emergent zoonoses. 
2.  Concomitant to this is the necessary rearrangement 
of responsibilities between States and non-state ac-
tors (NSA) to preserve such State primacy, or, alter-
natively, to (d)evolve accountable responsibility: For 
instance, State A gives State B or NSA X the author-
ity to delivery health care against disease Y. In the 
first instance of State primacy, all actors involved 
in disease Y defer to the State’s authority, and the 
State retains responsibility and accountability for 
health responses. In the second instance of (d)evo-
lutions, those States or NSAs to whom authority is 
(d)evolved assume responsibility – and account-
ability vis-à-vis the deferring State for the health of 
its citizens.  
3.  For example, this might work with regard to a Memo-
randum of Understanding (MoU) between a (weak) 
State A and a (stronger) State B in terms of (mili-
tary) logistical support in the event of a (zoonotic) 
epidemic. With a MoU in place prior to an outbreak, 
State A would pre-emptively grant authority to State 
B to assist. If State B failed to assist, or infringed 
upon the MoU, State A could hold it to account on 
behalf of the health of its (un)served citizenry.  
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Second, that individual human rights and health sys-
tems’ responsibilities be brought into better international 
balance. That brain gain for State B does not automati-
cally become brain drain for State A. On the one hand, 
programmes across the EU already exist to fund medical 
trainees from States A in States B which foresee their 
return, which are not always successful.17  On the other 
hand, national policies within EU Member States (B) are 
particularly attractive to professionals from States A 
where their certifications are recognized.18  An alterna-
tive to trainee programmes would be to have States B 
compensate States A for professionals who contribute 
to their brain gain, while enabling States B to continue to 
educate and train and retain further crops of such profes-
sionals.
Such a scheme would have three benefits: 
1. It would retain the individual right to migration; 
2. It would reduce development aid by directly contrib-
uting to the health systems of States A with clear 
lines of accountability; and 
3. It might in the long-term counteract the net effects 
of brain drain in States A. 
Third, that States, individually and in regional (EU) 
and international for a (UN, WHO) reorder the legal un-
derpinnings of health rights pertaining to citizens versus 
migrants. This is necessary for two reasons: 
1.  Human beings interact with one another regardless 
of such a differentiation, and so, too, do microbes. 
The distinction is obsolete.
2. By distinguishing between citizens’ rights as asso-
ciated with State responsibility, whilst excluding 
migrants, the legal lines of accountability are pre-
served: But the borders of health insecurity remain 
untouched. Expanding the health rights of migrants 
would shore up State responsibility while protect-
ing heath security for all. 
Research Parameters
The EL-CSID project has the ambition to codify and artic-
ulate the relevance of cultural, science and innovation di-
plomacy for EU external relations as part of a systematic 
and strategic approach. It aims to identify how the Union 
and its member states might collectively and individually 
develop a good institutional and strategic policy environ-
ment for extra-regional cultural and science diplomacy.
The over-arching objectives of this project are threefold:
1. To detail and analyse the manner in which the EU 
operates in the domains of cultural and science di-
plomacy in the current era; comparing its bilateral 
and multilateral cultural and science ties with other 
states, regions, and public and private international 
organisations.
2.  To examine the degree to which cultural, science and 
innovation diplomacy can enhance the interests of 
the EU in the contemporary world order and specifi-
cally, to identify:
a) How cultural and science diplomacy can con-
tribute to Europe’s standing as an international 
actor;
b) Opportunities offered by enhanced coordination 
and collaboration amongst the EU, its members 
and their extra-European partners;
c) Constraints, both existing and evolving, posed 
by economic and socio-political factors affecting 
the operating environments of both science and 
cultural diplomacy.
3.  To identify a series of mechanisms/platforms to raise 
awareness among relevant stakeholders of the im-
portance of science and culture as vehicles for en-
hancing the EU’s external relations. The research will 
generate both scholarly work and policy-oriented out-
put, which will be disseminated through an extensive 
and targeted dissemination programme.
Together, these objectives should not only contribute 
to a strengthening of EU policy towards the use of sci-
ence, culture and innovation in its wider diplomacy, 
but also to a deepening of scholarly understanding of 
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diplomacy as an abiding, if changing, institution. 
To these ends, EL-CSID will marshal an empirical and 
analytical narrative that will offer practical support 
to the further development and enhancement of the 
EU’s science, cultural and innovation diplomacy. It will 
study the current and future role of science, innovation 
and cultural diplomacy as a feature of its foreign rela-
tions through a programme of historical stocktaking 
and multidisciplinary and cross-national comparative 
research.
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